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Food product attributes related to geographical origins are a topical issue in global 
food trade. The provision of geographical labeling may occur through geographical 
indications under the mandated trade rules of the TRIPS Agreement, through 
trademarks, or through country-of-origin labeling. The overall effect of the expansion 
of geographical labeling on developing countries depends on a complex mix of market 
opportunities that may yield substantial benefits as well as implementation costs. 
Increasingly, the analysis of this overall effect will need to evaluate the joint impacts of 
different forms of geographical labeling on the market position of developing 
countries.  
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Introduction 
abeling that communicates the origin of products is becoming more prominent as 
consumers are increasingly concerned about the quality, safety, environmental, 
and social attributes of the foods they consume (Krissoff, Bohman, and Caswell, 
2002). Taken in its broadest terms, geographical labeling
1 communicates the sourcing 
of a product or attributes of the product within a defined geographical location. Three 
common types of geographical labeling are discussed in this paper: 
i.  geographical indications (GIs), which are a specific type of collective 
certification marks,  
ii.  trademarks, and the sub-categories of certification marks other than GIs, and  
iii.  country-of-origin labeling (COOL). 
In a globalized food system all three forms of labeling can provide valuable, albeit 
different, information to consumers seeking to know about the geographical origins of 
foods. On the supply side, there may be considerable differences in the motivations of 
producers and countries in different parts of the world for using the three types of 
labeling. 
Much of the literature on geographical labeling is focused on the WTO systems 
for GIs and certification marks, and on disputes related to these alternative systems. 
GIs are favoured by a country group led by the European Union, while a second camp 
led by the United States favours certification marks. For example, existing studies 
discuss several avenues for the resolution of the GI dispute (Vincent, 2007; Evans and 
Blakeney, 2006; Josling, 2006; Fink and Maskus, 2006; Rangnekar, 2004; Addor and 
Grazioli, 2002). Two papers in this special issue contribute to discussion of issues 
relevant to the interest of developing countries in the GI debate. Grote (2008) 
emphasizes the costs and benefits – price premia – of GI products. Sufficient 
economic profitability is a necessity for the success of origin-labeled food specialties 
in an otherwise label-fatigued European market. While limited empirical evidence 
suggests developing-country GIs can earn price premia, costs are assumed to be often 
underestimated. Marette (2008) discusses how EU regulation 510/2006 for GIs affects 
the profitability of foreign producers. Market access for foreign GIs could be further 
complicated given the EU’s high quality standards and labeling requirements. 
Relatively little economic research addresses the more general question of the costs 
and benefits, tradeoffs and complementarities between the three types of geographical 
labeling. 
Policy makers and producers in developing countries may have different motives 
from those of their counterparts in developed countries for promoting or opposing the 
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use of geographical labeling (Grant, 2005; Downes, 2004; Juma, 1999). This article 
contributes to the GI discussion by examining the impacts of alternative types of 
geographical labeling systems on developing countries. We focus on the opportunities 
and threats policy makers in developing countries face as they strive to maximize the 
benefits to their producers of use of geographical labeling. 
Background  
roducers and governments in several countries have spurred the development of 
various marketing strategies based on geographical labeling as the origin of food 
has emerged as a new purchasing criterion in the eyes of consumers seeking reliable 
quality signals. This geographical labeling is evolving from a fairly limited 
intellectual property rights (IPR) category to a broader spectrum of labeling 
alternatives that are a critical topic in the current Doha Round trade negotiations and 
may have important implications for economic development. Addor and Grazioli 
(2002) and Josling (2006) provide overviews of origin labeling and detailed 
discussions of the major distinctions between GIs, origin-based certification marks, 
and COOL. Here we highlight features of different types of geographical labeling that 
are important to understanding the overall benefits and costs of such labeling for 
developing countries. 
Geographical Indications 
Geographical indications are the most prominent type of geographical labeling. GIs 
constitute a distinct category of collective certification marks that all producers of a 
particular product in a certain region are allowed to use if they meet standards. 
Producers outside this specific geographical region are prohibited from using the 
collective mark. GIs are defined in article 22.1 of the WTO’s 1995 Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) as “indications which 
identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in 
that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is 
essentially attributable to its geographical origin.” Amongst the most prominent 
examples of geographical indications are the European Union’s Protected 
Designations of Origin (PDOs) and Protected Geographical Indications (PGIs). The 
EU’s  sui generis system offers exclusive production rights and considerable price 
premia to producer groups that hold PDOs and PGIs (Lence et al., 2006).  
Data show wide differences in countries’ uses of GIs as a means of protecting 
intellectual property (IP), promoting geographically distinct agricultural products, and 
providing consumer information. However, significant discrepancies exist with regard 
to the number of registered GIs internationally. The European Union’s Trademarks 
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and Designs Registration Office (OHIM) lists a total of 805 GIs, excluding wines and 
spirits. Café de Colombia is the only registered non-EU GI. The Geographical 
Indications & International Trade Network (GIANT, 2008) lists 773 registered GIs in 
2007. Developing countries account for only 11.5 percent when neither wines and 
spirits nor manufactured goods are considered (GIANT, 2008).
2 
While the creation of a multilateral register for GIs is the least controversial issue 
at TRIPS, a dispute has evolved among the country groups on whether a multilateral 
GI registry should be voluntary or mandatory. Critics of a mandatory notification of 
GIs argue that granting exclusive production rights to holders of GI names could 
create significant barriers to entry and/or force producers of similar though not 
identical goods out of a market. 
Trademarks, Certification Marks, and Collective Marks 
Trademarks, together with the subcategories of certification marks and collective 
marks, constitute a second category of geographical labeling, although not all of these 
marks carry a signal of geographical origin. GIs and trademarks serve the same 
underlying principles and face many of the same multilateral challenges. Their 
relationship remains unresolved when surveyed at the international level. Both offer a 
way to reduce information asymmetries and search costs in markets; these 
asymmetries and costs can otherwise create significant inefficiencies or inhibit 
transactions in trade for higher-quality food products. In addition, privately owned 
trademarks can act as the basis for the development of brands and quality reputations 
that consumers can use to distinguish among goods differentiated by origin. 
There is a significant difference, however, between the public versus private 
signals that flow from these two types of geographical labeling. Geography is at the 
centre of the publicly regulated GIs, and access is open to producers who can meet the 
GI standards. In contrast, the linkage between the proprietor of the trademark and its 
products is at the heart of trademarks, while the geographic link may be secondary. 
The complicated coexistence of registered GIs and privately owned trademarks is 
evident in the prominent disputes around Basmati rice, Darjeeling and Rooibos teas, 
and Ethiopian coffee beans. In these cases, the respective names are registered 
trademarks held by companies in countries other than the developing country claiming 
to be the geographical origin of the product. 
The treatment of trademarks under TRIPS has received differential levels of 
attention in the economic literature. Baroncelli, Fink, and Smarzynska (2005) and 
Fink and Smarzynska (2002) agree that filings of certification marks play an 
important role in the protection of intellectual property for specific geographical   S. Anders and J. Caswell 
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origins. However, as an indicator of their role in IP protection little is known about the 
global distribution and use of certification and collective marks in agriculture. 
In contrast to the heated GI debate, trademarks have a long history of use in 
protecting private IP and brand names, although mostly outside the agricultural sector. 
Figure 1 shows levels of trademark registrations across all trademark categories and 
associated products by groups of WTO member countries and leading economies from 
1975 to 2005. A preliminary search revealed that in 2005 roughly 8 percent of 2.43 
million worldwide active trademarks were registered for food and agricultural 
products, including meats (USPTO, 2007; WIPO, 2007). The distribution of 
trademark filings shows a similar pattern of imbalance in use as exists for GIs. 
Leading global economies and the fast-growing economy of China clearly lead in 
trademark registrations. At the same time, many developing regions of the world (e.g., 
Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East) lag behind in trademark filings, in both 













































































































Note: The data series represent numbers of cumulative domestic and foreign trademark 
registrations by WTO member countries. World region series were created by aggregating 
country-level series.  
Source: authors’ calculations based on WIPO (2007). 
Figure 1  Development of trademark filings by world regions and leading economies, 
1975-2005.   S. Anders and J. Caswell 
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Country-of-Origin Labeling 
The third major category of geographical labeling is country-of-origin labeling 
(COOL). It has received considerable attention around the world (U.S. GAO, 2003). 
COOL informs consumers about a product’s national origin, which may be an 
important criterion in their purchase decisions (Loureiro and Umberger, 2005). While 
GIs and some certification marks link geographical origin with a certain and 
guaranteed product quality, COOL is solely linked to geographical origin. This makes 
COOL both the simplest and vaguest form of source identification. COOL has usually 
been treated and discussed separately from geographical indications. However, stricter 
enforcement of COOL requirements in countries introduces an additional dimension 
to the debate over GIs and trademarks, especially certification marks. 
In the United States, proponents of U.S. COOL highlight the “right” of consumers 
to know the origin of their food as a means of reducing concerns about quality, safety, 
and production methods. Many U.S. producer groups have endorsed the country’s 
COOL program as a valuable marketing tool based on a positive country image that 
might give domestic farm produce an advantage over imports. However, much of the 
literature on the effects of the mandatory COOL program in the United States suggests 
that the costs of implementation for producers may very likely outweigh estimated 
consumer benefits (Lusk and Anderson, 2004; Brester, Marsh, and Atwood, 2004). 
Though there have been cost-benefit analyses for the United States, comparatively 
little attention has been devoted to the potential trade implications of mandatory 
COOL for developing countries. Compliance with COOL requirements may create a 
substantial cost barrier and competitive disadvantage for imported goods from 
developing-country suppliers. In addition, as discussed below, COOL could 
overshadow and even negate the quality-origin claims conveyed by GIs and 
trademarks. 
How the Expansion of Geographical Labeling May 
Affect Developing Countries 
o far, the overall economic impact of globalization for developing countries has 
been evaluated as mixed. Increases in international trade flows have been 
paralleled by an economic convergence of richer economies into clubs, leaving a 
significant portion of the developing world behind (Baddeley, 2006). Empirical 
evidence presented by Sala-i-Martin (2006) suggests that welfare improvements from 
globalization are significant for South and East Asia but have not reduced poverty in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Through a more active participation in the current Doha Round, 
and TRIPS negotiations in particular, developing countries are striving to add 
authority to their quest for greater equality in global food trade. 
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For example, an overall reason for developing countries to favour the extension of 
multilateral GI protection is to avoid the misappropriation of terms describing 
products in which they have a particular commercial, traditional, or national interest. 
It remains an open question, however, whether, and to what extent, proliferation of 
geographical labeling (better protection of geographical indications; increased use of 
trademarks of various types; and wider use of COOL) will achieve the outcomes 
sought by policy makers and producers in developing countries of supporting 
domestic production and exports. 
Studies that address the harmonization of IP protection for geographical labeling 
show that all three regulatory systems, GIs, trademarks, and COOL, create non-tariff 
trade barriers (Josling, 2006; Grant, 2005; Fink and Smarzynska, 2002; Williams, 
2002). To date, the effects of non-tariff barriers on the trade relations of developing 
countries have been most fully analysed for the WTO Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). The literature is in dispute 
with regard to the implications of SPS measures on agricultural exports from 
developing countries (Anders and Caswell, 2007; Henson and Jaffee, 2006; Josling, 
Roberts, and Orden, 2004). Here we explore four major issues that affect the likely 
balance of benefits from and costs of geographical labeling for developing countries. 
First, the major argument for consumers to favour geographical labeling is that it 
provides information on a product’s origin and quality, and this information is 
effective in mitigating quality uncertainty. Loureiro and Umberger (2005) explicitly 
emphasize that European consumers’ willingness to pay for specific geographical 
origins is closely linked to a positive eating experience and high product quality. 
Hence, “origin” adds extra value to Italian Parmesan, French Champagne, and 
Portuguese Sherry, as these products carry a portfolio of certified quality attributes, 
including food safety and consistent store availability. However, many or most foods 
from developing countries do not have the cachet and certified supply-chain systems 
that European geographical indications (PDOs and PGIs) can bank on.  
Second, the majority of policy makers in developing countries have no or limited 
experience in the use of the most demanding form of geographical labeling, 
geographical indications, as a policy tool. A broader protection of GIs at the 
international level may create yet another strong obligation for developing countries to 
invest scarce resources in establishing national GI frameworks. But chasing the dream 
of price premia for protected and origin-labeled products may prove costly. This 
burden may increase if the scope of GI protection is expanded. For example, Grant 
(2005) found that the administrative and financial burden associated with the creation,   S. Anders and J. Caswell 
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implementation, and transnational enforcement of a mandatory, multilateral GI 
register would require significant resources from developing countries. 
Third, there is a range of challenges facing producers in developing countries in 
using GIs. Rangnekar (2004) points out that developing-country producers pursuing 
traditional production methods under GIs might face unforeseen costs. Supply-chain 
adjustments, new and added quality assurance schemes, and record keeping could 
result in prohibitively high costs for protecting GIs. These costs would need to be 
subtracted from the anticipated benefits of GI labeled products. Echols (2003) states 
that obligations from a GI system could lead to additional overhead production costs 
comparable to those associated with international food safety regulations. 
In a case study for South Africa, Bramley and Kirsten (2007) find a strong 
economic rationale for producers to protect GIs. However, although GIs might 
provide a unique opportunity for market development in South Africa, the authors 
acknowledge that in some cases the economic premia for GIs could turn out to be 
marginal. Confusion already exists among consumers about the relation between 
geographical origin and quality given the multitude of existing GI labels in Europe 
and certification marks in the United States (Marette, Clemens, and Babcock, 2007). 
Thus, considerable market risk exists for new launches of geographical origin labels 
by developing countries. Finally, most resources have to be invested prior to the 
launch of GI labels, without assurance of rewards. 
Considering the stringency of a publicly regulated GI system along the lines of the 
EU system, an alternative consistent regulation of geographical labeling within the 
trademark system may constitute a more feasible and market-based option for policy 
markers and producers in developing countries. According to Bramley and Kirsten 
(2007), cost hurdles related to product registrations and period renewals in multiple 
markets in an alternative certification mark system could be prohibitive for resource-
poor producers. Irrespective of the type of protection, costly promotional efforts are 
required to convince consumers, at home and abroad, of origin-quality credentials that 
justify price premia for GI or trademarked products. 
Fourth, the existence of a mandatory COOL program and labeling requirements in 
the United States and elsewhere may have significant implications for the use of GIs 
and trademarks. COOL may complement or be superfluous to other forms of 
geographical labeling that are strong market signals of origin and quality. However, 
COOL as a market signal may substitute for and potentially swamp other forms of 
geographical labeling in cases where they provide weak signals of origin and quality. 
Recent cases of contaminated food ingredients and product recalls for Chinese 
products have shown that food safety incidents linked to a country of origin can result   S. Anders and J. Caswell 
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in overall negative notions of the quality of a country’s products and have detrimental 
effects on its trade relations. 
As with other forms of labeling, compliance with COOL may create substantial 
cost barriers for developing-country suppliers who lack the record-keeping 
infrastructure to maintain audit requirements (Chambolle and Giraud-Héraud, 2005). 
Studies investigating the implications of increasing food safety requirements (e.g., 
hazard analysis and critical control points, or HACCP) for developing countries 
suggest that the overall trade effects have been mixed. However, empirical evidence 
indicates that many small-scale developing-country exporters are made worse off 
(Anders and Caswell, 2007; Henson and Jaffee, 2006). 
The overall effect of the expansion of geographical labeling on developing 
countries depends on a complex mix of market opportunities that may yield 
substantial benefits and on the costs of implementing different systems of labeling. 
Increasingly, the analysis of this overall effect will need to evaluate the joint impacts 
of different forms of geographical labeling on the market position of developing 
countries. To date, the most comprehensive analysis available is related to the class of 
geographical indications under the WTO. 
Regulatory Issues for Developing Countries in 
Implementing Geographical Indications 
n order to attain consistent implementation of geographical origin rules, the WTO 
required members to bring their national legal systems for IPR protection into 
accordance with the TRIPS Agreement (TRIPS, Article 22.2). This implementation for 
developing countries has been supported by extended adjustment periods and calls for 
technology transfer, regulatory assistance, and technological and financial cooperation 
from developed countries. Since the success of any new GI policy framework in many 
developing countries will depend at least in part on the extent of technical, financial, 
and regulatory assistance from developed WTO members, the elimination of major 
inequalities in the future regulation of geographical origin labeling will not happen 
automatically (Evans and Blakeney, 2006; WTO, 2005).  
Two other major regulatory issues have arisen for developing countries in close 
relation to GI implementation. The first is in regard to the exemption clause in TRIPS 
Article 24, which explicitly regulates “generics”. These are products that a priori do 
not qualify for GI protection because their names have evolved into generic 
expressions (e.g., Basmati rice). The exemption of generic terms from GI protection 
has led to 175 bilateral agreements that regulate specific GIs apart from existing 
certification marks. In some cases these go beyond the current status of GI protection 
under TRIPS. 
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The EU and the United States both seek to promote their respective regulatory 
versions of a GI protection system in order to incur minimum adjustment costs and 
pursue their best economic strategies. Hence, bilateral agreements emerge as an 
additional commitment for developing countries. They also create restrictions that 
reduce the options for convergence of approaches on the GI issue in the interest of 
developing countries (Vivas-Eugui and Spennemann, 2006). As a result, developing-
country policy makers need to scrutinize bilateral agreements related to GI labeling 
for their conformity with their economic and societal priorities and coherence with 
other existing obligations in order to avoid unnecessary burdens for their producers. 
A second major regulatory issue for developing countries arising out of GI 
implementation is the process of claiming rights for new GIs. Certification marks, as 
private intellectual property, can create valuable brand recognition for the IP owner 
that is transferable. In contrast to IP, the exclusiveness and perpetuity of producer 
rights conveyed by GIs is quite constrictive. Any producer group aiming for 
multilateral recognition of a new GI bears the burden of proof, including all necessary 
expenses for full compliance with TRIPS requirements. This involves being able to 
prove at all times that the product’s quality is fully attributable to its origin. Moreover, 
producers – with the assistance of their government – must provide sufficient 
evidence of the GI’s long-standing reputation in the respective domestic market that 
would justify GI status. These requirements clearly limit the possibilities for 
developing countries to create new GI labels that have a strong market identity; they 
help to explain why trademarks are distributed across a much broader country base (as 
seen in figure 1) (Baroncelli, Fink, and Smarzynska, 2005).  
Fink and Smarzynska (2002) argue that the main hurdle for many developing 
countries is that GIs have to be protected domestically before they can be registered at 
the international level. This is in contrast to the situation in the EU, where the GI 
concept originated and which has large, established, commercial interests in assuring 
exclusive production rights. The same regulatory circumstances for international GIs 
do not exist in many developing economies. This implies an immediate disadvantage 
for those countries that already lag behind in the adoption of other international trade 
standards, such as food safety and technical trade regulation (Anders and Caswell, 
2007). 
Market Access and Trade Impacts for Geographical 
Indications 
everal countries, many of them commodity exporters and/or “New World” 
countries, have argued that GIs are inherently trade restrictive and have the 
potential to create non-tariff trade barriers. In fact, the current TRIPS protocol does  S   S. Anders and J. Caswell 
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not prevent the risk of misuse of GIs. Accusations led by the United States and 
Australia of discriminatory treatment by the European Union of foreign GIs and 
certification marks resulted in a call for a WTO dispute settlement panel (Evans and 
Blakeney, 2006). As a result of consultations, the EU has simplified its registration 
requirements for foreign GIs through amendment 510/2006 to EU regulation 2081/92. 
Regulation EU 510/2006 provides greater equivalence and reciprocity for products 
from third countries, granting easier market access and protection of GIs within the 
EU. This outcome may be particularly relevant for a number of developing countries 
producing traditional goods that might qualify as PDOs or PGIs.  
Given the diversity of agricultural production in the developing world, increasing 
investments in GIs may not always or frequently result in additional export revenues. 
Nor would better domestic GI policies guarantee developing countries better access to 
high-value export markets. In addition, there is some reason to believe that greater 
investment in GI protection by developing countries has poor prospects as long as the 
existing challenge of compliance with technical regulations and trade standards has 
not yet been successfully met. 
Supply-chain structures are a particular concern of policy makers, related to 
market access and the trade impact of GIs. The lack of sophisticated supply-chain 
structures common to products such as Gorgonzola cheese, Bordeaux wine, and 
Parma ham in Europe lessen the prospects of successful marketing of GI brands by 
developing economies. Well organized supply-chain strategies, promotion, and 
marketing systems for specialties like “Basmati rice”, “Ethiopian coffee”, or “Rooibos 
tea” are seen as prerequisites for the successful marketing of GI products. To date the 
only foreign GI that has been registered within the EU is “Café de Colombia” (EU 
510/2006). While Colombia had the financial and technical expertise to register and 
take advantage of its café PDO in the EU, many poorer countries that lack the 
necessary resources have not been able to achieve revenues from trade in their GI 
products.  
In addition, it remains unclear how the marketing of potential GI products from 
developing countries will be affected by the specific demands of intermediaries, such 
as global retail chains. Given the high priority consumers in Western economies place 
on food standards, it is unlikely that retailers in Europe or North America will waive 
existing requirements above and beyond regulatory requirements in favour of GIs 
from the developing world. Moreover, retail market power could deprive developing-
country producers of the benefits of GI labeling. For example, when Ethiopia’s coffee 
producers attempted to obtain certification marks for the region where its famous 
coffee is grown, producers had to contend with the global coffee giant Starbucks,   S. Anders and J. Caswell 
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which claimed property rights to use the geographical name (Adamy, 2007; Patrick, 
2008). 
A more equal and open multilateral system for GI protection may provide easier 
access to consumers in high-value markets. Once regulatory certainty is guaranteed, 
producer groups in developing countries may find it easier to raise the necessary 
financial resources to invest in private certification marks to secure the IP associated 
with traditional specialty food products.  
Conclusions 
any countries, and producers and companies within them, are making broader 
use of different types of geographical labeling, including geographical 
indications, trademarks, and country-of-origin labeling. A broader range of such 
labeling, supported in many cases by broader multilateral regulation and oversight, 
offers new opportunities for the protection of intellectual property rights and for the 
remunerate marketing of traditional or unique food products. However, taking 
advantage of these opportunities requires incurring costs.  
From a developing-country perspective, a broader sui generis protection of GIs 
along the lines of the EU system may create new barriers to trade due to standards and 
regulatory requirements in an otherwise increasingly open trading system. For 
example, India has a substantial interest in dairy exports given its strong dairy sector. 
Under future sui generis GI rules, India’s dairy sector would lose the right to export its 
version of Mozzarella cheese, which to date it does successfully (Williams, 2002). At 
the same time, it might gain the exclusive rights for Basmati rice. In light of the 
diverse production portfolios held by many developing countries, they could not be 
assured of greater gains than losses from expanded GI regulation under TRIPS. 
More generally, it is important to consider the overall impact of geographical 
labeling of all types on the developing countries’ market position in international 
trade. GIs may have the potential to support the export growth of some countries or 
regions, and trademarks likely provide a similar growth potential. However, the 
successful participation of developing countries in the current debate regarding 
systems for GIs and trademarks of various types may be insufficient for developing 
economies to achieve their expectations for benefits from such IP protection. Net 
benefits depend of the cost of participating in this type of marketing and the 
competitive environment. 
Among different types of geographical labeling, the debate on geographical 
indications has garnered the most attention in international circles. For a full 
perspective, this debate needs to be embedded in the broader context of geographic 
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labeling that affects the ability of countries to operate successfully in international 
markets. For example, COOL may be a complement or substitute to the signals 
conveyed by geographical identifications or trademarks of various types. When 
quality or safety problems emerge, they may be attributed to a broad range of products 
from a country or affect an entire country’s reputation rather than that of a particular 
supply chain. In these cases, consumers’ negative awareness of origin based on COOL 
may swamp the positive marketing effects created by GIs or trademarks. Overall, 
demand for products with a certain country of origin may decline as consumers are 
able to identify and avoid products “made in X”. 
Further empirical evidence is needed to evaluate the benefits and costs of 
geographical labeling for developing countries. For example, when problems occur do 
GI supply chains have independent reputations strong enough to withstand negative 
spillover effects from COOL? Ultimately, the success of geographical labeling as a 
tool for greater equality in international trade and for the protection of traditional 
knowledge will be determined by the interplay of the effects of different types of 
labeling on market shares, price premia, and the longevity of geographical brand 
names.  S. Anders and J. Caswell 
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Endnotes 
                              
1.   “Geographical indicators” is another overall term used to describe different types 
of origin labeling. We use the term “geographical labeling” as the generic term for 
these types of information signals in order to avoid confusion between 
“geographical indicators” and “geographical indications”, which are a specific 
type of indicator. We recognize that geographic labeling does not always include 
consumer labeling. 
2.   Large discrepancies exist between the total counts of GIs by different 
organizations. When GIs for wines, spirits, and manufactured goods are 
disregarded, both OHIM and GIANT list a total of around 800 GIs for agricultural 
and food products. An overlap exists between GIs and a small number of active 
certification marks that include a certified origin. However, the existing evidence 
suggests that, overall, developing countries play only a minor role in GI 
registrations. Exceptions are the rapidly increasing numbers of GI registrations 
from China and India, although most of them are for manufactured goods that are 
currently under-represented in GI databases. Appellations of Origin (APOs), 
another category of GIs protected under the Lisbon Agreement, play a major role   S. Anders and J. Caswell 
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for many European and/or wine-producing countries, but are much less relevant to 
developing countries. Out of the total 810 APOs, 700 are registered by EU 
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